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With the outbreak of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), each ethno-national 
group – Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats – set up its 
own football federation and began to organize its own competitions separately. 
Nevertheless, under strong pressure from FIFA, UEFA and the IOC, the three football 
establishments finally agreed to merge into a unified Bosnian Football Federation in 
2002 and to organize the Premijer Liga, the first united Bosnian post-war 
championship. Drawing on ethnographic studies conducted in BiH since 2003, the 
paper examines the consequences of such a revamped inter-ethnic competition both in 
terms of the re-integration of the Bosnian population, on the one hand, and the possible 
exacerbation of ethnic tensions, on the other. It is concluded that the reunification of 
the Bosnian football’s landscape helps to demonstrate how ethnicity is instrumentally 
used by the post-war elites to exploit the common good for private enrichment. 
 
Introduction 
Oh, if the people had their way, there wouldn’t be any problem at all! People are already ready 
to play all together in mixed championships. We already play friendly matches with Serb or 
Croat teams, indeed. The problem is only a political one: it is at the top of the political level 
that they make every effort to maintain the separations. 
With these words, a Bosniak coach introduced me into the controversial world of football 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth BiH) at the beginning of my fieldwork in 2003, 
confirming how sport, and notably football, functions as a contentious site for social, 
cultural and political representations1 in the interplay between territory, politics and 
identity.2 Although sport has usually provided some space for the expression of resistance 
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in former communist regimes,3 the new political apparatuses emerging from the 
breakdown of the latter seem to have inherited and maintained, especially in the Balkans, 
the old capacity to ignore the claims coming from the sporting sphere, thereby limiting its 
allegedly transformative potential. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, Yugoslavian football had undergone a progressive 
politicization. The emerging nationalist elites utilized the sport as a basis for personal 
enrichment, construction of power at the local level and political self-legitimization in the 
eyes of their own national groups. With the outbreak of the war in BiH, each ethno-
national group – Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs – set up 
its own football federation and began to organize its own competitions separately. After 
the war, Bosnian football was in a catastrophic condition, divided between three separate 
mono-ethnic federations, lacking financial and structural resources and controlled by 
incompetent speculators coming from outside the world of sport itself. 
Nevertheless, strong pressures from international sport governing bodies convinced 
the football establishments of the three ethno-national groups to finally merge into a 
unified Bosnian Football Federation (NFSBiH) in 2002 and to organize the first united 
Bosnian post-war championship, named the Premijer Liga. This paper examines the 
consequences of such a revamped inter-ethnic competition both in terms of the 
reintegration of the Bosnian population, on the one hand, and the possible exacerbation of 
ethnic tensions, on the other. 
Several studies have analysed the role of sport in promoting social integration and 
development,4 particularly in conflicting societies,5 highlighting both the alter-globalist6 
and neo-colonialist7 potential of sport as a civilizing medium. Many scholars have warned 
about the difficulties in assessing sport’s impact on social regeneration,8 which are also due 
to the complexity of the field and the variety of actors involved.9 As noted by Gasser and 
Levinsen while analysing the Open Fun Football Schools programme in BiH, the 
achievements of sport-based interventions depend heavily ‘on the interactions between 
local, national and international players as they struggle to advance their multiple agendas 
in both the little game (football) and the big one (winning the peace)’. Hence, ‘OFFS long-
term success hinges on the successes of the local officials, international organizations, 
international and national sporting bodies and others who work to develop Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as a multi-ethnic nation’.10 The impact of ‘bottom-up’ sport initiatives at the 
ground level in polarized communities strictly depends on the consequences of ‘top-down’ 
interventions and governance dynamics on the overall context. While the former are often 
intentionally designed to generate social integration, the latter affect peace-building 
processes also through the indirect fallout of their own functional and organizational 
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logics. This is the case, for example, of the partial discrepancy between the criteria adopted 
by FIFA, UEFA and the IOC to accept new member federations, on the one hand, and 
those embraced by the UN to recognize state sovereignties, on the other. By examining the 
reunification of Bosnian football after the bloody wars of the 1990s, the paper seeks to 
explore this multi-layered interplay. 
Since an exclusive focus on ethnicity would run the risk of reifying ethnic-based 
representations, the role of Bosnian football will be analysed in relation to the broader 
interaction order and power system which such representations serve to hide and/or 
legitimize. Indeed, a key issue in BiH is the way social distrust is nourished and ethnicized 
by the ruling elites. According to Bieber, ‘ethnic distrust is both a way to channel broader 
frustration and a mechanism to re-produce distrust’. Such a mechanism causes 
‘disengagement from politics and helps to sustain parties that re-affirm low trust politics 
and, while not being particularly trusted themselves, direct high levels of distrust 
elsewhere’.11 
The paper draws on ethnographic research conducted in BiH since 2003 through 
participant observation, in-depth interviews and informal conversations, complemented 
with the study of other secondary data, notably content analysis of various media sources. 
The fieldwork was carried out with a primary focus on football practitioners (players, 
coaches, officials, supporters) from semi-professional to grass-roots level, while 
simultaneously sharing everyday interaction with various kinds of other ordinary people.12 
The secondary data were collected both directly in the field and by monitoring a wide 
range of online sources, thus ensuring a broad and differentiated access to information, in 
order to partly offset the bias of the involved and situated perspective.13 
Moving from Gasser and Levinsen’s remark that ‘as a terrain for re-integrating 
communities polarized by war, football is something like frontline farmland: fertile, but 
likely to be mined’,14 the paper is divided into three main parts. The first part illustrates the 
condition of football in the post-war Bosnian context by analysing the interplay between 
ethnicity, socio-economic inequalities and power relations. The second part explores the 
connections between the growing unification of the Bosnian football community, the 
qualitative development of Bosnian football and the potential overcoming of the 
particularistic system hidden behind ethnic division. The third part analyses the enduring 
capacity of the criminal elites who lead Bosnian football to preserve the status quo, thus 
demonstrating how the first decade of a partly unified Bosnian championship – besides 
providing opportunities to downplay the relevance of ethnicity – has also generated a 
‘mined field’ where ethno-national tensions continue to be fostered. 
 
4 
 
 
Ethno-nationalist profiteers: the exploitation of Bosnian football 
In contrast to what happened to other ex-Communist countries, the Yugoslavian 
breakdown took place through armed conflict. Ethno-nationalist politics guided by 
Milošević and Tudjman led to the war between Croats and Serbs, which quickly spread to 
the territory of BiH, involving its multiethnic population. 
The tremendous conflicts of 1992–1995 accelerated the ethnic polarization in BiH, 
thus forcing the people to side with one or the other ethnic group.15 The country’s social 
landscape drastically changed after 97,207 people died or disappeared (2.2% of the 
population)16 and half the population of 4.4 million was displaced (1.2million emigrated 
outside the boundaries of the state and another million left their places of origin remaining 
within BiH).17 
While stopping the fighting, the US-brokered Dayton Peace Agreement of 
November1995 froze and legitimized the situation generated by the war after more than 
three years of violence, atrocities and ethnic cleansing. The formal integrity of the state 
was preserved by making ethnic differences integral to the new Bosnian institutional 
design.18 BiH was established as a single country with two separated entities: the 
Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federacija19 BiH, the latter comprising Croats and 
Bosniaks, who were themselves actually divided at the cantonal level. 
A complex administrative system guaranteed equal representation to the three 
Bosnian ‘constitutive peoples’ by trebling every political seat, thus creating hypertrophic, 
but weak and inefficient central institutions, while leaving great autonomy and power at 
the local level (entities, cantons, municipalities). This was partially balanced by 
establishing the UN Office for the High Representative, endowed with the so-called Bonn 
powers to impose a wide range of decision over the local politicians and even to dismiss 
some of them, thus making BiH a semi-protectorate.20 
Reflecting the country’s general situation, the condition of post-war Bosnian football 
was disastrous: inept speculators with no passion for sport capitalized on the ethnic 
rhetoric to rule three distinct federations, exploiting the few available resources and 
causing further impoverishment of the game’s quality. As each ethno-national group began 
to organize its own competition separately, post-war football was played into mono-ethnic 
areas. 
Nevertheless, following strong pressures from FIFA, UEFA and the IOC, the 
football establishments of the three ethno-national groups finally consented to come 
together into a unified Bosnian Football Federation21 in 2002. The new Federation was 
shaped following the Dayton model, with a tripartite presidency and a seats-rotation 
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system between the representatives of each ethno-national sub-federation, which continued 
to exist separately. Although intended to be a temporary solution, this structure operated 
until April 2011, when the UEFA suspended the NFSBiH and replaced its board with a 
‘normalization committee’ in charge of mediating between the Federation’s members, and 
finally amended the statute by replacing the current tripartite-rotational structure with a 
single-member presidency (the consequences of this change will be discussed later in this 
paper). 
The first united Bosnian post-war championship named Premijer Liga was organized 
in 2002, while the lower divisions remained ethnically separated at the entity and 
regional/cantonal levels (with the Prva Liga Federacije BiH and the Prva Liga RS 
henceforth serving as the second national leagues). A united championship was also 
organized at the youth level since the 2003–2004 season, but only for the country’s U-18 
best teams, while all the other youth tournaments remained separated. When the Premijer 
Liga started, just seven years after the end of the armed conflict, there were many concerns 
about its possible negative consequences in terms of inter-ethnic tensions. Actually, by 
putting teams and fans from different ethnic backgrounds into contact, the football world 
became a potential ‘mined field’, giving room both to physical and (mainly) 
verbal/symbolical/psychological violence. Nonetheless, a deeper understanding of the role 
played by ethnicity in shaping the Bosnian context during and after the war helps to 
highlight also the integrative potential of a unified Bosnian football world. 
 
Ethnicity, particularism, clientelism 
Following the Yugoslavian breakdown, ethnicity and nationalism became the main basis to 
gain political legitimacy and economic power in BiH. The ethno-nationalist ideology, 
characterized by the claim to establish new nation-states based on ethnic dominance or 
homogeneity, was rhetorically used to hide and reshape the symbiotic relationship between 
political power and organized crime structures.22 Inter-ethnic trust was broken by creating 
separated (mono-ethnic) life-worlds, thus fuelling tensions and feeding the war through the 
propagandistic demonization of the ‘others’. Such a separation has been maintained and 
reinforced in post-war everyday life, within each of the three life-worlds, by strengthening 
the symbolic representations of distinctive imagined communities through the antagonist 
reconstruction of physical symbols (notably religious buildings and cultural monuments)23 
and the differentiation of flags, school textbooks and programs, streets names and signs, 
tourist guides, etc. In this way, the newly reshaped physical, cognitive and emotional 
landscapes have been further embodied into visibly displayed banal nationalism, thus 
rewriting Bosnians’ history culture.24 Ethnic hatred, hostility and intolerance therefore 
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have to be considered both as a tool used by the local political and criminal entrepreneurs 
to feed the war, and as a result of the war itself, rather than simply the cause of the 
conflict.25 
In the post-war BiH, local elites were often composed of people who had gained 
power positions through illegality and crimes during the conflict while championing the 
ethnic cause. Victorious nationalists continued the Balkan tradition of patronage26 by 
replacing the communist ideology with the ethno-national one. Ethnicity became the 
recognition criteria used by the local elites to legitimize particularistic allocations and 
parasitic use of social power. Furthermore, it was (and continues to be) used to deny 
responsibilities by laying the blame on the other groups. As the allocation of resources is 
mainly based on cronyism and ethnic affiliation rather than redistributive justice and 
professional qualifications, in each field of Bosnian society, many competent people have 
been relegated to the lowest ranks of the social hierarchy.27 
Those people who reject the exclusive hegemony of the ethnic self-representation in 
favour of more universalistic and meritocratic criteria of recognition can be considered as a 
liminal group composed of individuals who share a marginal position within the power 
structure28 and would therefore have an interest in acting collectively to improve their 
condition. Nonetheless, they tend to remain a quasi-group until they do not find the 
conditions for their aggregation and mobilization29 alongside different cleavages, 
alternative to those defined by the ethno-national belongings. 
Meanwhile, at the top of the social pyramid, the nationalist elites of the three groups 
stage the ethnic struggle in front of public opinion, only to then partake in the advantages 
of such an ‘ethnic sharing’ of power and exploited resources, when they are backstage.30 
Being tacitly allied and mutually concerned with maintaining the relevance of the ethno-
national cleavage, they prevent a large part of the population – disadvantaged by this 
socio-political order – from coalescing against them alongside the ethnically cross-cutting 
socio-economical cleavages.31 
 
Inverting the route? 
Such a vicious circle is also evident in Bosnian football, exploited by incompetent (and 
sometimes criminal) elites who do not care about the decreasing standards of the game. 
Especially in the first post-war years, the leaders at the NFSBiH utilized the national team 
to pocket money from useless friendly matches, as well as to cap unknown low-quality 
players, thus increasing their value and selling them internationally through their agents 
(BiH has a higher proportion of FIFA players’ agents for its footballers than any other 
country).32 Local championships have also been habitually exploited through match fixing, 
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clientelism and illegal misappropriation of Federation’s funds. Similar attitudes 
characterize the practices of many club officials who manage public resources for private 
enrichment without making any personal investment, as football clubs in BiH are not 
private companies, rather public associations predominantly funded out of municipal 
budgets. This situation reduces the spectators’ interest and the public relevance and 
visibility of Bosnian football, thus removing it from the public view and favouring its 
privatistic and parasitic management by the incompetent elites, while further 
disempowering the competent operators and football enthusiasts. 
Therefore, the unification of Bosnian football can be considered to be a ‘fertile land’ 
mainly if (and insomuch) it helps to break such a vicious circle, i.e. to (1) settle the ethno-
national separations by enabling a wider imagined community, (2) re-publicize football by 
restoring its visibility and accountability and (3) enhance the quality of football by 
promoting meritocracy. This virtuous circle would foster a ‘displacement of conflicts’,33 
downplaying the relevance of the ethno-national cleavage (Bosniaks vs. Croats vs. Serbs) 
while highlighting the meritocratic confrontation (competent/enthusiasts vs. 
criminals/profiteers). It is therefore important to assess if and how the development of a 
united Bosnian football community provides an arena in which the dominance/relevance of 
ethnicity as a recognition criteria can be questioned by counter-discourses that celebrate 
alternative criteria. 
 
Fertile land? 
This section explores the connections between the widening/unification of the Bosnian 
football community, the qualitative development of Bosnian football and the potential 
overcoming of the particularistic system hidden behind the ethnic separations. 
 
Settling the ethno-national separations: towards a wider imagined community? 
In football, as in other spheres of Bosnian everyday life, the armed conflict has created 
three separated worlds, which are still persisting long after the end of the war. This is 
highlighted by this young Bosnian Serb comments taken in 2004: 
 
Do people in RS follow the Bosnian Premijer Liga? 
Well . . . we do follow it, yeah, but . . . not as much as we follow or read what happens in 
Serbia – ‘cause the Serbian are our ‘brother-people’. I mean, in Republika Srpska you don’t 
have enough information at your disposal to be able to follow what happens in BiH, for 
instance about football . . . at least if we consider the news that reach us in Republika Srpska. I 
mean, everybody read Serbian media, everybody eat food made in Serbia, and so on . . . Do 
you understand what I mean? Although there is also something coming from BiH . . . But we 
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mainly read the Serbian mass media. You read stuffs coming from Belgrade: Većernji Novosti, 
Sport, and so on. We read their newspapers, you understand? Otherwise, when I read a 
Bosnian newspaper . . . we only read about our own teams, those from the Republika Srpska. I 
may read something about Sarajevo and Želježnićar, but nothing about the other teams . . . (P., 
22, from the Bosnian Serb town of Šipovo) 
 
The unification of Bosnian football has contributed to bringing these separated worlds 
together, at least in part, by stimulating the football enthusiasts to travel to the former 
‘enemy territory’ to attend matches of the newly established Premijer Liga.34 
 
Now we have it here very close, in Modrića [Serb town] – I mean, the Premijer Liga – and a 
lot of people comes from the neighbourhood. A lot of players from Gradaćac [Bosniak town] 
went to attend the last match, but I’ve also noticed many people from Šamac, from Ođak 
[Croat town] . . . Among the neighbouring towns, only Modrića and Orašje have a team in 
Premijer Liga at the moment, so everybody want to come here to watch Željo, Sarajevo, Čelik, 
Borac, Leotar . . . (S., 37, from the Bosnian Serb town of Modrića) 
 
For many of them, this was their first and only motivation to cross the old front lines and 
set foot in what was ‘enemy territory’: 
 
Do you travel to Modrića sometimes? 
Well, yeah . . . Recently we’ve been there to attend a match of Premijer Liga, and we’ll surely 
go to watch other matches . . . 
And . . . what apart from football? Are you used to go to Modrića also for other reasons? 
No, just therefore, just therefore. Well, now I and my friends – those I usually go to the 
football matches with – have planned to go there also to attend some volleyball match, when 
the championship will begin. You know, Modrića is close to Gradaćac, it’s not far. (I., 34, 
from the Bosniak town of Gradaćac) 
 
The unification of Bosnian football has increased the occasions for encounters, especially 
among people who already knew each other before the war, but had been separated by the 
conflict.35 This is particularly the case for many people who are actively involved in 
football as trainers and athletes, especially at grass-roots level. Eager to get out of a self-
referential mono-ethnic football world that limits the possibilities for constructive 
confrontation, which is necessary to sporting improvement, many sport enthusiasts 
welcome the enlargement of the Bosnian football landscape as an occasion for comparison 
and reflexivity. For instance, just after getting to know a Bosniak colleague from a 
neighbouring town, a Bosnian Serb youth coach told me: 
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I’ve just got to know Alija. He has immediately invited me to play some friendly match in 
their town, and I don’t back down, this is what I want to do with the children that I’m 
coaching. I’m in favour of such initiatives, because . . . I want to support the club I work for, 
and create a good football school. Therefore . . . I take this upon myself, so that I can see 
which teams from Federacija BiH have more money, and which of them are working better 
with the children. There, the first goal at the moment is to reach them, see where we are 
positioned when compared to them, try to play with them. It’s neither that easy, nor that quick, 
but . . . this is our first goal . . . So far, we have achieved very good results with our youth 
teams in Republika Srpska playing against the youth teams of Leotar, Slavija, Glasinac, 
Sokolac, which are all clubs from Premijer Liga or Prva Liga. But we don’t know where we 
are positioned, when compared to the teams from the Federacija . . . (R., 43, youth coach from 
the Bosnian Serb town of Nevesinje) 
 
Another important element contributing to the widening of the Bosnian imagined 
community is the increasing mobility of players, especially at the professional level. While 
teams used to be mono-ethnic when the Premijer Liga began in 2002, they are now 
increasingly becoming mixed. Similar to other professional activities, football enables the 
development of weak ties among people who downplay ethnicity while focusing on the 
pursuit of common achievements/interests.36 At the same time, such a process enhances the 
relevance of the team’s sporting identity while reducing, at least in part, its ethnic 
representativeness37: 
 
At the very beginning of the new Premijer Liga the teams were mainly mono-ethnic, but now, 
say, a Muslim guards the goal of Borac [the team of Banja Luka, the main Bosnian Serb town], 
a Serb is the main striker of Željo [‘Bosniak’ team from Sarajevo], a Muslim goes to play for 
Zrinjski [the ‘Croat’ team of Mostar], the coaches . . . the coaches go and interchange, the 
players interchange as well . . . I think that it [the Premijer Liga] has had quite a good 
influence on this exchange between people. (E., 42, youth coach from the Bosniak town of 
Bosanska Krupa) 
 
Further steps towards the normalization of Bosnian football can be noticed from the 
progressive shift from ethnic rivalries to traditional local and sport rivalries. Classic 
matches between famous teams catalyse more interest than others, no matter what the 
ethnic backgrounds of the teams are. For instance, the match between the Bosniak team 
Želježnićar and their Bosniak city rivals Sarajevo is much more thrilling than the match 
between Želježnićar and the Croat team Orašje, or the Serb team Leotar. 
Also, the classical rural/urban cleavage38 often becomes more relevant than the 
ethno-national one in the unified Bosnian football arena. For instance, when the Croat 
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team of Široki Brijeg from Herzegovina complained about being damaged by the NFSBiH 
in favour of the biggest teams Želježnićar and Zrinski in 2004, they did not relate the 
discrimination to ethnic reasons – Zrinski is a Croat team as well, indeed – rather to the 
fact that Široki Brijeg was penalized for being a small peripheral town while Želježnićar 
and Zrinski benefited from representing themain cities of Sarajevo and Mostar, 
respectively.39 Common urban roots and belonging can become more relevant than ethno-
national affiliations, as indicated by the director of Slavija, the club of the Bosnian Serb 
part of Sarajevo: 
 
Let me tell you this: even nowadays our football team Slavija has far better relationships with 
Željo and Sarajevo than with Borac of Banja Luka! Now, someone might probably ask ‘Wait, 
how is this possible?’, but . . . it has nothing to do with the usual ethnic antipathy, it is not the 
reason why we are in good terms with someone rather than others, in this case. We are in 
better terms with someone simply because . . . sport circumstances require that we are in better 
terms with them rather than with Borac. And when we come to Modrića . . . we couldn’t stand 
each other’s sights, we couldn’t even look in each other’s eyes . . . 
Before the war or after it? 
Before the war they didn’t even exist! We were like Bundesliga to them! They were really 
kind of a peasant-team . . . 
 
Re-publicizing football by restoring its visibility and accountability 
Another crucial issue to be examined is whether the unification of the Bosnian 
championships, by promoting a wider imagined community out of the three separated 
mono-ethnic worlds, can contribute to re-publicization of football as a public good, 
rescuing it from the hands of the current incompetent elites. 
The connection between the visibility and accountability of football can be explored 
by analysing the perceptions of the Bosnian enthusiasts about the quality of refereeing 
after the first two seasons of the new Premijer Liga: 
 
Well . . . since they have made a unified Premijer Liga the level is increasing. The fact that 
referees come from different areas has enhanced the quality of refereeing. Quite a selection has 
been made, preventing some people from refereeing, whom I don’t know how had been 
included in those lists: there were some refs here . . . people who were outside the world of 
sport before the war, but then the war – I don’t know how – has helped to fly very high. 
However, the way they flew high, the same way they’ve fallen down! In short, the level has 
improved. I follow the Premijer Liga, as far as I can, in Tuzla, now in Modrića, sometimes I go 
to Sarajevo, and I can tell that the level of refereeing is much better than it was just after the 
war. (N., 37, youth coach from the Bosniak town of Gradaćac) 
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These narratives, collected in 2004, tend to connect football accountability to the increase 
of both its national and (potentially) international visibility: 
 
I think that now the situation with the referees has improved, but only at the level of Premijer 
Liga, the unified one, because now those refs aspire to referee in the European Cups – they 
can’t referee in the Champions League yet, we haven’t that level yet, but they could referee for 
instance in the UEFA Cup. Yeah, I think that now the refereeing has a bit improved there, but 
in the lower categories I think that things are not going well yet . . . (D., 39, from the Bosnian 
Serb town of Modrića) 
 
The difference between the Premijer Liga and lower leagues seems to further confirm the 
impact of the new enlarged tournament in connecting football visibility and accountability: 
 
Now I tell you how it works here. It doesn’t matter if you’re in the first team, or in the youth 
sector: at home, most of the referees help you, while when you play away . . . Ok, now the 
Premijer Liga is a little changing; but apart from that, if you look at all these lower categories, 
lower than the Premijer Liga . . . Anyway, in the Premijer Liga they can’t referee dishonestly 
because there are the cameras, you know, one can see it . . . there are controls. (H., 22, from 
the Bosniak town of Gradaćac) 
 
However, despite these initial signs of change, in the last decade, football has continued to 
be exploited by criminals and unqualified profiteers. At the same time, the unified football 
landscape has also provided an arena for the Bosnian enthusiasts’ protest and resistance, 
aiming to restore the public value of football. 
Since its first season in 2002, many clubs participating in the Premijer Liga – often 
led by the country’s most historically important clubs Želježnićar, Sarajevo and Borac – 
coalesced across ethnic divides against the Federation’s officers, appealing all the other 
clubs to formally associate in order to better defend their rights, and sometimes even 
threatening to retire from the tournament. Although contingent clubs’ interests were 
obviously often behind the protests, trans-ethnic collective arguments were used to support 
the dissent, such as ‘the salvation of Bosnian football’ and ‘cleaning the football house up 
from corruption’. 
Similar arguments were used by the organized fans of the different clubs, who often 
arranged several trans-ethnic collective protests in front of the NFSBiH seat in Sarajevo, as 
well as by the BHFanaticos, mainly composed of supporters from the Bosnian diaspora, 
who usually display their ‘Rat savezu!’ (War to the Federation!) banners at the national 
team games. 
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Along with the fans, famous players and other public personages are vocal about 
their opposition to the football establishment. For example, on 30 October 2006, 13 
Bosnian national team players (Bajramović, Bartolović, Berberović, Bešlija, Grlić, Grujić, 
Hasagić, Hrgović, Milenković, Misimović, Papac, Spahić and Tolja) published a letter of 
protest in the Dnevni Avaz daily after some corruption scandal involving the officials of 
the NFSBiH in 2004, announcing that they would boycott all national team matches until 
the Federation’s leaders resigned: 
 
Regarding all that have happened around our national team, we, football players who currently 
fight in the pitch for the blazon of the country, feel the need to announce our stances to the 
public opinion . . . We’ve had enough that the members of the Presidency Milan Jelić, Iljo 
Dominković i Sulejman Čolaković, as well as the national team director Ahmet Pašalić, seal 
the destiny of our football and national team. We will no longer accept call-ups to the national 
team while these people are performing these functions, hoping that our gesture will mark the 
first step in the healing of this cancer in our soccer and a new beginning for the national team 
for which our hearts beat.40 
 
Nevertheless, not even this sensational stand changed the situation, and the immovable 
Federation’s leaders continued with their unaccountable management, raising further 
frustration and dissent. 
In 2008, the well-known former striker Meho Kodro, who had been appointed as the 
national team manager in January being guaranteed full independence in the technical 
management of the side, quickly broke his relationship with the NFSBiH in just a few 
months after refusing to take charge of the team for a game against Iran in Tehran, 
arranged by the Federation without his knowledge. On 1 June 2008, while the BiH national 
side was facing Azerbaijan in a friendly match in Zenica in front of just 50 spectators, a 
friendly humanitarian game between former Bosnian football legends, organized by Kodro 
and Elvir Bolić to protest against the NFSBiH, was played in Sarajevo at the same time in 
front of 15,000 people and broadcasted by the FTV.41 
In November 2009, the former NFSBiH secretary general Munib Ušanović, together 
with the finance and marketing secretary Miodrag Kureš, were sentenced to five years in 
jail over tax evasion and illegal misappropriation of the NFSBiH funds.42 However, despite 
continual scandals, the Federation’s officers never resigned and persisted with their 
criminal management until 1 April 2011, when FIFA and UEFA suspended all Bosnian 
teams from international competition to punish the unwillingness of the NFSBiH to amend 
its statute. The tripartite presidency was considered no longer acceptable by the main 
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governing bodies of international football, and the Bosnian federation was required to 
finally have a single president. 
Such a measure roused further important statements to support the re-publicization of 
Bosnian football. Worried that the national team would be prevented from playing the last 
decisive matches of the Euro 2012 qualification,43 the Bosniak member of the BiH joint 
presidency Bakir Izetbegović addressed a letter to Joseph Blatter and Michel Platini, the 
FIFA and UEFA presidents, respectively, appealing for a solution: 
 
Without wishing to interfere . . . in your activities, I voice my sincere conviction that you will 
find an adequate solution to establish in Bosnia a football organisation of the best quality to 
allow Bosnia’s national team and our clubs to continue taking part in European competition . . 
. You certainly know that Bosnia-Hercegovina is a complex country . . . It would be 
unfortunate that irresponsible behaviour of members of our (football) federation prevents our 
international and local football players from taking part in international matches. Hundreds of 
thousands of their fans do not deserve that.44 
 
Even the Dean of the Sarajevo University wrote a letter to the UEFA President Michel 
Platini: 
 
Dear Mr. Platini, I’ve decided to address you on behalf of teachers, associates and more than 
40,000 students of the University of Sarajevo, from all over Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
abroad . . . Personally, this is the first time to me to write a letter to any sport organizations. 
The reason behind my addressing to you is my concern for the football in B&H, and thus 
extending to the B&H society as well . . . Essentially, I want you to recognize the real culprits, 
no matter from which milieu they come and regardless of their names, and to punish them 
most severely, and to open a path of healthy development for the football in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and without the impact of politics, living in and living from the football, and the 
same time undermining the system of a country that is allowing them to do so.45 
 
The talented midfielder of the Bosnian National team Miralem Pjanić, interviewed by the 
French newspaper L’Equipe, confirmed: 
 
It’s very serious. It’s a huge shock for the players and those that love Bosnian football. The 
people to be blamed are the federation’s officials. We are simply hostage to incompetent 
people, who think only of making profit on the back of our efforts rather than about the team. I 
hope UEFA and FIFA now take the right decisions. We love our country and we always want 
to wear its colours. It’s not us who should pay. The country is already poor – they cannot take 
football away from us. Today, lots of people demonstrated outside the hotel where the meeting 
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took place. We will discuss it among (the team) but if there is anything that can be done to 
help our cause, it must be done.46 
 
A temporary solution was found by dismissing the past officials and establishing a 
normalization committee working under the hugely respected former Yugoslavia coach 
Ivica Osim, who gained the trust of the ethno-national representatives and worked out a 
compromise involving a single-member presidency.47 This welcome change led to the 
suspension being overturned on 28 May and the normalization committee, initially set up 
only to manage the emergency phase, was confirmed as being in charge on 29 October 
until the end of 2012. 
 
Enhancing the quality of football by promoting meritocracy 
Since the very first seasons of the Premijer Liga, the quest for transparency and 
accountability in Bosnian football has been linked to the quest for fair competition, 
meritocracy and improving the playing standards. This connection is well expressed by the 
words of a Bosniak football enthusiast interviewed in 2003: 
 
In the last round of the championship we went to Modrića, to watch Modrića-Zrinški. But it 
was an ugly match. You see, while watching that match we recalled the matches that ones we 
used to play in the late 80s, and I think those team that played in the then Regional League 
were much stronger than the ones currently playing in today’s Premijer Liga. Nowadays the 
quality is . . . nothing. Nothing when compared to how it should be, if you look at the English 
Premijer League, or the Italian championship, or the Spanish one, and so on . . . You know, a 
desire would be that one could see something similar in our country as well. I would like to go 
to Tuzla, at the Tušanj stadium, to watch Sloboda playing against, say, Željo, or Sarajevo, or 
whatever, and see just that level, that football. And not to see, on the contrary, a . . . war 
between two teams! (A., 32, from the Bosniak town of Gradaćac) 
 
Also, the increasing mobility of practitioners and followers slowly generated by the 
normalization of Bosnian football, by providing occasions for comparison and reflexivity, 
has contributed to encourage the quest for fair competition, meritocracy and improving 
playing standards. This link is well exemplified by the words of a Bosniak nonprofessional 
player interviewed in 2004, just after he signed his first transfer to a neighbouring Serb 
team in the RS’ Second League. The quote shows how, by attending a match of his future 
team, he had the occasion to compare the standards of football (notably refereeing) in the 
two Bosnian entities and develop some self-critical reflections, thus eluding the usual 
ethno-national sanctification of ‘us’ and demonization of ‘them’: 
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Last time that they (my forthcoming teammates) played away I went to watch the match. The 
referee really looked like someone coming from a higher category . . . and I was really 
surprised from the way he refereed. ‘Cause both teams were competitive and wanted to win, 
and the match was balanced. He even disallowed a goal to the home team, a goal that I 
wouldn’t have disallowed. He said he had seen a foul, and that’s how he decided . . . The 
refereeing was excellent, and also the players were fair; if someone got injured, they kicked the 
ball out to break the game, they apologized . . . In our matches it is not like that. Well, I would 
like that . . . if we are better, we win 10:0, and if you are better, you win 10:0. But it’s not like 
that, unfortunately. (E., 31, amateur footballer from the Bosniak town of Gradaćac) 
 
While initially almost all the matches in the BiH Premijer Liga were won by the home 
teams, such a trend has recently changed and victories of the guest teams are more 
frequent.48 However, the situation has not improved in the lower leagues. Still in 2011, 
some players of the Prva Liga Federacije BiH publicly asserted that ‘Refs are the Bosnian 
football’s greatest evil’ and ‘Playing under these conditions doesn’t make any sense’49; 
eight teams of the same league jointly protested that ‘Time for change has come, ‘cause we 
cannot tolerate such a situation, with Prva Liga FBiH no more being a place for correct 
people and football enthusiasts’.50 
However, the recent establishment of the normalization committee has fostered the 
hope for professional competence and passion to finally become the main criteria when 
appointing people in the leading positions, as exemplified by this quote from a Bosniak 
youth coach interviewed during the summer of 2011: 
 
It will be much more difficult than people expect. It can’t easily happen, now, that some Osim, 
Hadžibegić, Bajević, who are all worldwide well-known people, suddenly order: ‘You will be 
here, you will be there’ . . . I believe in some 3–4 years they will build a good system, so that 
worthy and competent people, who above of all love football, will float to surface. I myself 
have had many problems in football because of my stances, and I’ve been relegated to the 
margins, so that I’ve been forced to work with some smaller club, and so on. However, I 
believe in 3–4 years the right people will reach their deserved place. (E., 42, youth coach from 
the Bosniak town of Bosanska Krupa) 
 
Nonetheless, many Bosnian enthusiasts remain sceptical about the possibility of 
eradicating the incompetent elites, as they fear that former officials will use their patronage 
(clientelar) power to quickly regain charge by manipulating the future elections, after the 
normalization committee finishes its job. 
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Mined field? 
The high conservative capability of the criminal elites who lead Bosnian football by hiding 
behind ethno-national masks exposes the ambivalent potential of the sporting arena. 
Besides providing opportunities to downplay the relevance of ethnicity, indeed, the first 
decade of (partially) unified Bosnian championships has also generated a ‘mined field’ 
where the ethno-national tensions can be fostered, giving room both to physical and – 
mainly – verbal/symbolical/psychological violence. 
 
Verbal/symbolic violence 
Since the first Premijer Liga season, slogans and offences have been emphasized through 
the use of war symbolisms, particularly by the – relatively small, but vociferous – groups 
of organized supporters. Drawing on derogatory terminology of war, the Serb fans were 
called ‘ćetnik’ by the Croat or Bosniak opponents, the Croat fans were called ‘ustaša’ by 
the others, while the Bosniaks were called ‘balija’.51 
Serb fans occasionally welcomed Bosniak supporters brandishing banners stating 
‘Nož, žica, Srebrenica’ (Knife, barbed wire, Srebrenica), thus celebrating the Srebrenica 
massacre in which approximately 7000 Bosniaks were killed by Ratko Mladić’s 
paramilitary bands. This obviously offended many Bosniaks; for instance, supporters of 
Želježnićar from Sarajevo once retaliated by making their own banner stating ‘Od Sarajeva 
do Borika, nigdije neće biti ćetnika!’ (From Sarajevo to Borik, there won’t be no chetnik), 
and displaying it to the Bosnian Serb fans of Borac Banja Luka. 
Croat banners have been displayed to celebrate ‘Ante Gotovina’ (a Croat war 
criminal) and ‘Oluja’ (‘Storm’, a huge retaliatory operation against Serbs in 1995). Both 
Croats and Serbs occasionally use the ‘Ubij Turćina’ (Kill the Turk) and ‘Mrzim Bosno’ (I 
hate Bosnia) banners, while exclusively Serbs use the banners hymning ‘Ratko Mladić’ 
and ‘Radovan Karadžić’. As far as they are concerned, Bosniak extremist supporters 
welcome their Croat and Serb opponents by waving Turk flags, thus enforcing the 
representation of their stadium and the Bosniak-majority area as a hostile Islamized 
territory. 
Nonetheless, a very controversial aspect of the transformations characterizing the 
unified Bosnian football can be noticed in the trans-ethnic use of ethno-nationalistic 
offences. Indeed, nationalist symbolisms are sometimes curiously used not to reaffirm 
one’s own ethnic belonging, rather to outrage the opponents as much as possible. 
In order to achieve such a goal, some supporters go as far as borrowing symbols and 
slogans from the other ethnic groups. For example, during the match between two Bosnian 
Serb teams – Modrića and Slavija – in May 2003, the fans of both teams addressed each 
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other with the following offences: ‘Stupid chetniks!’, ‘You love Alija (Izetbegović)’, ‘Also 
Radovan Karadžić roots for us!’. In the first case, the term ‘chetnik’ was used – by Serbs 
against Serbs – in the same derogatory way in which it is usually used by Bosniaks and 
Croats against Serbs. In the second case, the opponents were offended by equating them to 
Bosniaks. In the third case, by claiming to be backed by Karadžić’s support, one group’s 
members classified themselves as ‘first-class-Serbs’ and the opponents as ‘second-class-
Serbs’. 
Another example occurred when Široki Brijeg (Croats) played against Želježnićar 
(Bosniaks) in May 2003. Besides chanting ‘Burn the balija!’ and ‘Kill the Turk!’, the 
supporters of Široki Brijeg also chanted ‘Knife, barbed wire, Srebrenica’, thus implicitly 
celebrating the Serbs – who are not exactly supposed to be the Croats’ role models! – for 
the massacre they orchestrated against the Bosniaks. Even more surprisingly, while doing 
so, they also raised the three-fingers salute,52 usually flashed by Serbian soldiers as a 
nationalist sign during military operations and therefore perceived as highly offensive by 
the Bosnian Croats themselves. 
A third example is even more paradoxical. During the match between two Bosniak 
teams in August 2003 – Sloboda of Tuzla and Želježnićar from Sarajevo – a banner of the 
Sloboda’s supporters stated ‘Why didn’t the Serbs kill you as well?’. In this case, it was 
the Bosniaks supporters who went as far as celebrating the Serbs just to outrage the 
Bosniak rivals. Despite the severity of such an outrage, it came from people of the same 
ethnic group and was therefore perceived as a purely sporty offence, instead of an ethnic 
one. 
Insults linked to ethno-national belongings and memories of the recent war have 
therefore ambivalent consequences. On the one hand, the transformation of the ethno-
national outrages into normal provocations between rival fans groups may change their 
original function and meaning, partially reducing their relevance in terms of ethnic 
opposition. On the other hand, they provide the Bosnian fans groups more opportunity to 
provoke one another, making the Bosnian matches more flammable. 
 
Riots and physical violence 
Football riots involving physical aggression have been less common than expected in the 
unified Premijer Liga, although a number of serious incidents did occur during these 10 
years. One of the main reasons for the relatively low intensity of fights is the small number 
of fans attending the Bosnian championship, with core groups of organized supporters 
usually numbering just dozens or, at most, hundreds of people.53 Furthermore, a strong 
police presence has helped to reduce riots (according to some of my interviewees, there are 
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sometimes more policemen than fans in the stadium). On the other hand, especially in the 
first Premijer Liga seasons, the police have been criticized for unfair treatment of visiting 
supporters, thereby contributing to make the stadium a hostile territory for the guest teams 
and their followers. 
Although thousands of matches have proceeded quite peacefully in the Premijer Liga 
since its beginning in 2002, the relatively few incidents ending up in physical 
confrontation and damage immediately attract the attention of the mass media. One of the 
most discussed cases was the death of Vedran Puljić, a Sarajevo fan killed before a match 
in Široki Brijeg in 2009. More recently, much attention was also paid to three important 
incidents that happened within a couple of weeks between September and October 2011: 
the fans of Borac attacking those of Želježnićar in Banja Luka, the supporters of Zrinski 
assaulting the players of Velež during the derby in Mostar and the (supposed) fans of 
Hajduk Split fighting followers of Želježnićar before a friendly match in Sarajevo. 
The increased frequency of the riots appeared to reflect a rise in inter-ethnic 
intolerance, thus recalling the Yugoslavian football clashes which preceded the war in the 
early 1990s.54 Yet, many observers highlighted that the incidents happened – in close 
succession and in all the three main ethno-national cities (Banja Luka, Sarajevo and 
Mostar) – in the very week when a delegation of UEFA and FIFA was awaited in Sarajevo 
to discuss the possible extension of the normalization committee’s mandate.55 The 
incidents might therefore have been devised and orchestrated by former members of the 
football establishment who had been dismissed and marginalized after the settlement of the 
normalization committee. According to this interpretation, they aimed at undermining the 
positive atmosphere of inter-ethnic cooperation already established by the committee in 
just a few months, thereby ‘proving’ its ineffectiveness and leading to its removal.56 
 
Media amplification 
The impact of all these forms of physical and verbal/symbolic violence on the Bosnian 
public opinion depends very much on the way they reverberate through the usually 
factious media coverage. Indeed, despite several heroic stories of extremely qualified 
editors and journalists who paid high personal prices for impartially reporting about the 
social and political events before, during and after the Yugoslavian breakdown, the 
majority of the mass media are presently controlled by the ruling ethno-nationalist elites.57 
Bosnian media coverage of football riots contributes to intensify ethnic separation in 
three main ways, i.e. through out-groups denigration, inter-ethnic fights amplification and 
out-groups misrecognition. 
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The first and most common way consists highlighting and stigmatizing the outrages 
perpetrated by the out-group fans, while downplaying those committed by in-group 
supporters. For example, after the riots between the Široki Brijeg fans (the Škripari) and 
those of Sarajevo (the Horde Zla), Bosniak media celebrated the killed Sarajevian fan 
Vedran Puljić as a victim of the Croat hooligans, while Croatian media portrayed the 
alleged murderer Oliver Knenzović as the defender of the city from the predetermined 
attack launched by Horde Zla. 
The second way consists the very amplification of inter-ethnic fights between 
football fans, which, even when non-factiously accounted, plays into the hands of those 
arguing for the impossibility of inter-ethnic peaceful cohabitation. As bad football stories 
are generally considered more newsworthy than good ones, football stadia are more 
frequently depicted as ‘mined fields’ rather than fertile lands. It follows that mass media, 
by simply reporting about football riots, serve as a megaphone for messages and gestures 
spreading nationalistic hatred, even independently from any politically driven editorial 
line.58 
A third contribution to enforce the ethno-national partition is made by the majority of 
the Croat and Serb media through their agenda setting, which pays more attention to the 
sport news regarding athletes and teams from Croatia and Serbia, while only marginally 
reporting BiH sport by presenting it together with (or even after) international sport news. 
Such an approach is more evident in the Serb media, which take advantage of RS being a 
formal administrative entity with high territorial autonomy to ambiguously present the 
sporting news about BiH as if they regard it as a foreign country. 
The impact of mass media on inter-ethnic relations and power networks can thus 
vary from extremely direct and explicit to more indirect and unintentional forms. As an 
example of the first pole, mediated statements about sport can be used by the ethno-
national leaders to increase social distrust, as the RS President Milorad Dodik did by 
publicly declaring that he supports the Serbian football team and would only cheer for BiH 
if they were playing Turkey, or that the RS will accept to further stay within BiH only if, 
among other things, it will be allowed to have its own sport representative team at 
international competitions.59 On the other hand, given the link between ethnicity and 
patronage networks in the Bosnian power system, by simply highlighting football riots, 
mass media contribute to nourish the social distrust which feeds patronage relations and 
corruption dynamics in Bosnian football and society at large.60 
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Conclusion 
This paper has sought to illustrate the complex role played by the reunification of the 
Bosnian football landscape in affecting socio-political identities and power relations in the 
post-war environment. On the one hand, football reunification has surely contributed to 
further unveil how ethnicity is instrumentally used by the Bosnian elites to exploit the 
common good for their private enrichment. To use Hirschmann’s words,61 in a country 
where people are mainly divided between the loyalty option (i.e. accepting and actively 
supporting ethno-national politics) and the exit one (i.e. passively giving up after 
experiencing frustration and resignation), the football world becomes, at least in part, an 
arena where those who are disempowered by the current status quo can express their voice. 
At the same time, while confirming football’s potential for the mobilization of public 
opinion, the Bosnian case shows how it can also be easily used by the establishment to 
preserve the status quo. 
A distinction can be made between the public sphere, built upon ordinary 
interactions among football practitioners and enthusiasts, which provides fragments of 
normalization and de-ethnicization of the everyday life, and the far more visible media 
space which spreads to a broader audience mainly negative news about incidents and 
fights, rather than positive reports regarding spectacular matches, local football stars or the 
festive atmosphere in crowded stadia. 
Hence the quest for fair competition, meritocracy and improved playing standards, 
implicit in the inner logics and rhetoric of sport, and supported by many Bosnians keen on 
football, had only limited success in advocating transparency and accountability. To a 
large extent, the football world has mirrored the country’s social and political evolution, 
going from a partial normalization of inter-ethnic relations in the early 2000s to an 
increasing impasse in the later years, nourished and capitalized on by the ruling parties. 
The partial autonomy of football from other social spheres, based on both its inner logics 
and its reliance on international independent governing bodies, still seems too weak in BiH 
to challenge the hegemony of the political and criminal elites. The constitution of a 
professional clubs association in charge of directly running the championships (so far 
managed by the NFSBiH), together with the transformation of football clubs from public  
(municipal) associations into private companies, would plausibly increase officials’ 
accountability and motivate them to assume their own responsibilities. 
Nonetheless, whereas changes ‘from below’ find it hard to emerge, the partial 
autonomy of sport displays its effects ‘from above’ through decisions imposed by FIFA 
and UEFA. Breaking away from the Dayton model, the new NFSBiH is becoming the first 
Bosnian institution to be headed by a single president, i.e. without the rotational balance 
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system which is usually claimed to guarantee each ‘constituent people’ not to be 
overpowered by the others. However, this very system has so far paralysed BiH, since the 
fear of becoming a minority was used – sometimes with good reason, sometimes 
speciously – to impose vetoes on any kind of political, social and economic reform. Hence, 
the new Federation could serve as a testing ground for possible transformations of the 
broader institutional apparatus, providing insightful answers to some crucial questions: 
What will happen to the Croats and Serbs in Bosnian football henceforth? Will things work 
better – both generally and for them – or will they be overcome by the Bosniaks? 
Moreover, in the event that it works better, will this experience constitute an example also 
suitable for the BiH politics, or will it simply be attributed to the peculiarity of the sport 
world? 
Although this last question recalls once again the unsettled scientific challenge of 
isolating sport’s impact from the many other societal influences (politics, media, economy, 
judiciary and police will certainly play a great role either in supporting or boycotting the 
work of the normalization committee), the Bosnian context surely represents an insightful 
case for further research and observation. 
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40. See http://www.sarajevo-x.com/sport/reprezentativci-bih-nece-igrati-dok-ne-odu-jelic-
dominkovic-colakovic-i-pasalic/061031019 
41. Babić, ‘Svi na Koševo’. 
42. Zuvela, ‘Bosnia Soccer Officials’. 
43. As the suspension threatened to damage the then-seemingly-likely qualification of the national 
team to the European championship in 2012, most of the appeals came from the Bosniaks, who 
mainly identify with the Bosnian side (while the great majority of the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian 
Serbs root for Croatia and Serbia, respectively). Nonetheless, pleas also came from the 
representatives and fans of the Bosnian Serb club Borac from Banja Luka, having just won their 
first Premijer Liga and therefore expecting to play the UEFA Champions League’s preliminaries. 
44. See ‘Bosnian Leader Appeals to UEFA over Ban’. http://www.kickoff.com/european-
league/31735/bosnian-leader-appeals-to-uefa-over-ban.php 
45. Retrieved from unsa.ba/s/images/stories/pdf/a1-n/uefa.pdf 
46. E.T. ‘Pjanic: ‘“Un énorme choc”’, L’Equipe. 
http://www.lequipe.fr/Football/breves2011/20110329_180655_pjanic-un-enorme-choc.html 
(accessed March 29, 2011). 
47. Wilson, ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina’s United Return’. 
48. Although this does not necessarily mean that match fixing has disappeared – as it rather became 
more subtle and complex, detaching from the simple rule that ‘the home team has to (be made) win’ 
– now results are a little less predictable and therefore the matches are more interesting to the 
spectators. 
49. Škorić, ‘Sudije su najveće zlo’. 
50. Škorić, ‘Osam klubova’. 
51. During the WWII, the ćetniks were the Serbian royalist paramilitary combatants, while the 
ustaša were the soldiers of the Croatian fascist anti-Yugoslav separatist movement. Both names 
have been recalled during the recent Yugoslav wars in the 1990s and are mutually used as 
derogatory terms. The word balija, once used to describe descendants of Turks of Ottoman Empire 
in the Balkans, has become a slang name used for Bosniaks as an insult or description by Croats or 
Serbs. 
52. The three-finger salute is almost exclusively used by Serbs. Apart from having religious 
meanings, it had also been used as a nationalist sign before and during the Yugoslav wars, and was 
often flashed by Serbian soldiers during military operations. Therefore, among Serb opponents in 
the Yugoslav wars – Croats, Bosniaks and Albanians – the three-finger salute is usually perceived 
as a provocation, especially when directed at them personally. 
53. In the first half of the 2010–2011 season, the average attendance in Premijer Liga was 1563 
spectator per match (from the 4167 of the Sarajevo team to the 607 of Olimpik). The highest 
attendance was 15,000 spectators for Sarajevo, 8000 for both Želježnićar and Borac, and 5000 for 
Celik (http://www.european-football-statistics.co.uk/attn/avebih.htm). 
54. Radenović and Karać, ‘Sportski tereni’. 
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55. Dautbegović, ‘Huligani u službi’. 
56. Hasić, ‘Navijaćki izgredi’. 
57. After the decline of the once respected newspaper Oslobodjenje (Liberation) – which managed 
to maintain a multiethnic staff with high professional standards and impartiality even under the 
tremendous war conditions, but was not able to ‘survive the peace’ – independent journalism could 
be mainly found in the two Sarajevian weekly Dani and Slobodna Bosna, and the newspaper 
Nezavisne Novine from Banja Luka (whose editor-in-chief Željko Kopanja lost both of his legs in a 
car-bomb assassination attempt in 1999). For a detailed and touching account of the media’s role in 
the Yugoslavian breakdown, see Kurspahić, Prime Time Crime, partially summarized in Kurspahić, 
‘Missed Opportunities’. 
58. See Skaka, ‘BHT1 kao megafon’. 
59. Dnevni Avaz, ‘Dodik: Spremni smo’. 
60. For a deeper reflection on the complex interplay between mass media, sport and corruption – of 
which the Bosnian case represents an indirect example – see Numerato, ‘Media and Sports 
Corruption’. 
61. Hirschmann, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. 
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